A
chariot is not asserted to be other than its parts,
Nor
non-other. It also does not possess
them.
It
is not in the parts, nor are the parts in it.
It
is not the mere collection [of its parts], nor is it their shape.
[The
self and the aggregates are] similar.
– Chandrakirti, Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s)
“Treatise on the Middle Way”
Introduction
When I was about ten years old,
my friends and I would throw rocks at each other. This led to a kind of self-inquiry, as I
later found out. Smack! My friend's rock hit my arm. “I got you,” he said with glee. “No you didn't,” I retorted smugly, “You
only got my arm.” Then he went for
something closer to home. Bonk! The rock landed on my head. Now I got you!” “No, that was only my head.”
Later, I thought a lot about this, for many years in fact. There was no place a rock could land that I
thought was truly me. In fact, whatever
“X” could named was not me, because it was “My X.” But where was the “I”?
It's not as though I didn't have a strong sense of it. I did, especially at first. This is why I looked so hard for it for so
many years. But no matter where I
looked, it seemed to keep shifting around, almost as though it was always in
back of me! Even as a youth, years
before I had ever heard of Buddhism or nondualism or Chandrakirti, the
inability to find the “I” really did begin to weaken my sense of its reality.
The Sevenfold Reasoning is a
Buddhist meditation on the ultimate nature of things – persons (the “I”) and
phenomena. In the traditions of
Buddhism that utilize the Sevenfold Reasoning (such as the Dalai Lama's sect,
the Gelukba Madhyamikas), the ultimate nature of things is said to be
emptiness. The Sevenfold Reasoning is
based on the teachings of Chandrakirti, an 8th-century Indian
Buddhist teacher. Chandrakirti provided
a way to inquire into the ultimate or final nature of things, as a way to help
relieve suffering. In doing so, he extended
the arguments of Nagarjuna (2nd-3rd century), whose
monumental Treatise On The Middle Way
had systematized the teachings in the Perfection
of Wisdom Sutras (100BCE – 100CE).
According to these sutras and teachings, it is the ignorance or
misconception about the way things exist that keeps sentient beings in
suffering and cyclic existence.
Sentient beings have the conception that phenomena (as well as they
themselves!) exist in a very solid, independent way, whereas nothing really
exists in this way. When this
conception ceases, ignorance ceases, and suffering ceases.
The Sevenfold Reasoning is a
set of inferences that one contemplates deeply. Even though they are an intellectual process, it is known as a
meditation in the Buddhist Middle Way teachings. The reasonings are to be gone into intensely, with the full force
of one’s feelings about how things are.
The reasonings are not a method of “no-thought” or of turning the mind
away from objects. Instead, objects are
taken full-strength, faced directly and forcefully. When these powerful reasonings are gone into fully, one’s view of
one’s self and the world is deeply shaken.
For a moment it might feel as if the earth has turned upside down, or
one has fallen into a huge crevasse.
Thereafter, things, including one’s sense of self, do not really have the
same inert heaviness any longer. In
Middle Way treatises, it is said that if the Sevenfold Reasoning seems too
abstract, intellectual or irrelevant, and if it does not engender deep feelings
of something having shifted, then perhaps it is not the best meditation for
now.
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Mistaken Conception
What is this mistaken
conception of how things exist?
It is
partly a matter of feeling and partly a matter of thinking. The feeling component is partly a felt sense
that things are somehow really there, solid, independent, separate from us, and
somehow casting themselves towards us.
The thinking part is an intellectual sense of things as self-sufficient
and independent of everything. To flesh
out this intellectual strand of total independence from everything, Middle Way
treatises speak of three kinds of independence. For example, if a cup exists inherently and independently in the
way that matches our conception of “independent of everything,” then it exists
independent of causes and conditions, independent of its own parts, and
independent of being observed by a mind.
For suffering beings, the feeling and intellectual sense of inherent
existence apply to any cognizable object, whether it is a school bus, the
feeling of joy, “2+2=4.” This is an
example of the conception of the inherent existence of phenomena.
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This sense or conception
applies not just to phenomena but also to people, including ourselves. We appear to exist inherently just like the
coffee cup. For example, after a swift
kick in the shin or a false accusation (or a true one!), a very palpable sense
of an inherently existing self arises.
Blood and anger might arise, the stomach might get queasy. “How could they do that to me?
I’ll show them!” This sense,
fired by the pain of indignation, seems to point to a self that is really
there, and at the moment, very offended.
This sense of self (not the insulted-ness but the self that has suffered
the insult) is a sense that feels like I am really there. This sense does not seem like a self that
depends on causes and conditions. It
does not seem to be dependent on the parts and pieces of the body/mind, and it
does not seem to be dependent upon being imputed by thought. It seems like one very wronged but very real
self. This is an example of the sense
of inherent existence -- the inherent existence of the “I.”
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It is said in Middle Way
Buddhism that this conception of inherent existence is a misconception. It is said to be a misconception because
although things appear to exist in this way, they actually do not
exist in this way. Although the
conception of inherent existence is present, inherent existence itself can
nowhere be found. This unfindability of
inherent existence is the emptiness that Middle Way Buddhism teaches about.
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Note on the Teachings of Emptiness:
There is a traditional caveat given to those desiring to study the teachings or reasonings on emptiness. The caveat, which is given in most texts and scholarly commentaries on the subject, warns that emptiness does not entail utter non-existence, nihilism, or psychological depression. It also advises that the teachings on emptiness should only be studied by (i) those who burst out in tears at the mere mention of the word "emptiness," (ii) those whose hair stands on end at the mention of the word, or (iii) those who have faith in such teachings and who feel certain that emptiness does not negate conventional cause-and-effect as presented in the Buddhist path.
The reason for this caveat is to prevent a nihilistic approach to life and the Buddhist path. The teachings on emptiness attempt to show that spiritual progress is possible exactly because things are empty. But the nihilistic reaction to the teachings is an offtrack misunderstanding, which manifests partly as (i) a mistaken belief that since everything is empty there is no conventional cause-effect relation between phenomena, and (ii) a hopeless feeling that there is no point to spiritual progress. Most teachings on emptiness attempt to counteract this nihilistic approach. See, for example, the works referred to in the footnotes at the end of this article.
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What the Reasonings Refute – Inherent Existence
The Sevenfold Reasonings refute
inherent existence, which is also called the “object to be negated.” The conception of inherent existence, along with the grasping feelings discussed above is called the “object to be abandoned.” Inherent existence itself is called the “object to be negated.” The Sevenfold Reasonings work like this: once inherent existence is deeply understood not to exist, then the conception of inherent existence (along with the grasping) will be abandoned spontaneously. That is, once we thoroughly negate the “object to be negated,” the “object to be abandoned” will no longer appear.
How does this work?
We see a cup. Because it appears to really be there under its own steam, independent
of causes, independent of its parts, and independent of being perceived, it
appears to be inherently existent. Not
only does it appear to be inherently existent, we might also actually believe
that it exists this way. This
appearance and this belief make up the conception of inherent existence. The conception of inherent existence is said
by Middle Way Buddhism to be the root of suffering. Moreover, just because we have the conception of inherent
existence does not mean that inherent existence really exists. It is sort of like having the idea of a
unicorn, or seeing a snake where there is only a rope. Just because we have the conception of an
object does not establish the existence of that object.
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The Sevenfold Reasoning
provides a meditative way to look for inherent existence and see that it is not findable.
Once inherent existence is clearly seen to be not-findable, the conception
of inherent existence will cease. The
end of this misconception is said to be the end of cyclical existence, and amounts to the Buddhist Third Noble Truth – the cessation of
suffering. The Sevenfold Reasonings are part of the Buddhist Fourth Noble Truth, which is the path leading to the end of suffering.
The reasonings explore the
questions, “What is the relationship between the car and the parts of the car?”
and “What is the relationship between my self and the parts of my
body/mind?” If the car really existed
inherently the way it appears to, then this inherent existence entails certain
things about the parts of the car. If
the I existed inherently as it seems to, then this entails certain things about
my body and mind. Using the Sevenfold
Reasoning, we can see whether these entailments make sense. If we can see that the implications of
inherent existence are not true, then we can see how inherent existence itself
cannot exist. If we can see this, then
the conceptions of inherent existence will cease and there will be freedom from
suffering.
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What the Reasonings Do Not Refute – Conventional Existence
If things do not exist truly or
inherently, do they exist at all? Or do
they totally and utterly lack existence?
The Buddha is quoted as saying, “What the world accepts, I accept. What the world does not accept, I do not
accept.” In the Middle Way teachings,
it is said that things do exist conventionally. The conventional existence of the cup is the everyday ability of
the cup to hold tea, to be washed and dried, and to shatter if dropped. The cup is a mere nominality or imputation
or “say-so,” asserted by the mind dependent upon certain pieces and parts. This conventional cup serves the purpose of
a cup even though if it were analyzed with the Sevenfold Reasoning, it would
not be found. The fact that it would be
unfindable under this analysis is not significant, since nothing could
withstand that analysis. The purpose of
the Sevenfold Reasoning is not to negate every possible thing that can be
negated; rather, it is to negate inherent existence – the conception of which
causes suffering.
The Sevenfold Reasoning is not
applied to refute the conventional, everyday existence of things, such as the
teacup, the self that goes to the grocery store, or the Yankees who won the
2000 Subway Series. There are three
main reasons for not refuting conventional existence. One is that conventional existence, according to Middle Way
Buddhism, is not the cause of suffering.
Therefore, there is no necessity to refute it. Two, not refuting conventional existence allows Buddhism to be
able to “speak with the world” by accepting what the world accepts.
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Three, not refuting
conventional existence provides a way for Buddhism to present the Four Noble
Truths and the eight-fold path to the end of suffering. Even though the Buddhist teachings are vast
and profound teachings, they are still conventional existents. By not refuting conventional existence while
indeed refuting inherent existence, Buddhism itself can tread the Middle Way
between the extremes of existence. If
conventional existence were refuted along with inherent existence, the Buddhist
path would not be possible since nothing would be said to exist. Refuting conventional existence would err on
the side of nihilism. Retaining
conventional existence avoids this extreme.
On the other hand, if inherent
existence were not refuted, then too the Buddhist path would not be
possible. Inherently existent things
are independent of everything and therefore causeless, untouchable and
eternal. If things existed inherently,
they would be forever frozen in place, and no change or progress along the
Buddhist path would be possible.
Suffering entities would forever remain suffering entities. For Buddhism not to refute inherent existence
would err on the side of eternalism.
Avoiding both extremes is the Middle Way.
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The Sevenfold Reasoning - Preparation
In Middle Way treatises, there
are two preliminary steps that facilitate the Sevenfold Reasoning. Their purpose is to make the reasonings “up
close and personal,” to help put the “object to be negated” clearly in
sight. The first step is for the
meditator to generate a clear sense of inherent existence. This can be done by imagining, for instance,
a serious, embarrassing and public insult, and then deeply experiencing the
thoughts and feelings that occur. These
arisings are said to depend on the conception of inherent existence. This process of summoning up the feelings is
not dangerous, and the effort does not make the sense of inherent existence
stronger and more firmly entrenched.
Rather, it allows the meditator to generate a clearer, more visceral
image of what is to be negated. It
keeps the meditator's conception of the “object to be negated” from being too
thinly intellectual, and keeps the meditation from being merely a
word-game. It is a lot of work!
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The second preliminary step is
to review the overall dynamic of the Sevenfold Reasoning. You can proceed like this, following this
pattern: If X, then Y. Not Y.
Therefore, not X.
a) If
the inherent existence of the chariot (or the self) were established, then this
inherent existence would be findable in at least one of the seven ways.
b) It
is not findable in any of the seven ways.
(The Sevenfold Reasoning itself is gone through in this step.)
c) Therefore
the inherent existence of the chariot (or the self) is not established.
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The reasonings are based on a
common-sense search for the object called inherent existence, based on the
example of, say a cup, a chariot, or one's self. If inherent existence of the cup is a findable thing, existing
the way it appears, then it ought to be either the same as the parts of the
cup, or different from the parts of the cup.
This is analogous to looking for a cat in the house. If she is findable in the house, then she is
either in the living room or somewhere other than the living room. But if she is found not to be in the living
room and not to be anywhere else in the house, then we can safely say there is
no cat in the house. Indeed, if we can
feel as certain about the dynamic of the Sevenfold Reasoning as we feel about
the cat analogy, then this very insight starts to chip away at our conception
of inherent existence, and a feeling of peace and joy can result.
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The Sevenfold Reasoning on the Selflessness of Persons
Personal things often rivet our
attention while impersonal things are hardly noticed. The conception of inherent existence of persons (such as one's
self) causes more suffering and is harder to remove than the conception of
inherent existence of non-personal phenomena such as cars and trees. According to Middle Way Buddhism, both kinds
of conceptions must be refuted in order to end the ignorance that causes
suffering and cyclical existence. The
conception of the inherent existence of phenomena is the root of the conception
of the inherent existence of persons.
This is because the senses perceive phenomena such as shapes, sounds,
colors, textures, etc. The mind, if it
considers the final nature of these phenomena, considers them to be inherently
existent. For some phenomena, perhaps
the shape of an arm, a hand, or a face, or the sound of a voice, the mind
attributes the entity of person. For
the mind that considers the final nature of this person, the person is
considered to be inherently existent.
In Middle Way teachings, it is said that without realizing the
selflessness of persons, it is not possible to realize the selflessness of
phenomena. So the meditative reasonings are done first
on persons. Even so, it is often recommended
to beginners to familiarize themselves with the reasonings by using the example
of a car, or chariot, as in Chandrakirti’s example.
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We will simply list the seven
steps for these phenomena, and then examine the reasonings in terms of
persons.
The Sevenfold Reasoning on the
Selflessness of Phenomena:
1.
The
car is not inherently the same as its parts.
2.
The
car is not inherently different from its parts.
3.
The
car is not inherently dependent upon its parts.
4.
The
car is not inherently the substratum upon which its parts depend.
5.
The
car is not inherently the possessor of its parts.
6.
The
car is not inherently the mere collection of its parts.
7. The car is not inherently
the shape of its parts.
The Sevenfold Reasoning on the
Selflessness of Persons:
The reasonings on the selflessness of persons try to
find the true person. They search by
trying to isolate the inherent existence of the person in relation to the parts
the body/mind. For purposes of one's
meditation, the parts of the body/mind include everything related to what one
thinks of as one's self. It can be any
physical, mental, moral or psychological phenomenon whatsoever. We might think of ourselves as a body, a
mind, set of memories, or a collection of character values, or something that
essentially includes all of these. The
reasonings go like this. With a firm
sense of this inherent existence in mind, we try to isolate it – is the
inherent existence of the self exactly the same as the parts of the
body/mind? Is it different from the
parts? These first two steps of the Sevenfold Reasoning logically cover all the
bases. The self is either inherently
the same as, or different from, the parts.
The other steps of the reasonings are valuable to go into because they
keep the meditation from being purely an intellectual exercise. We might, for example, truly feel that the
self owns the body/mind. This is the conception to get at, even
though it is logically entailed by the self being different from the
body/mind. Once all the reasonings are
gone through in depth and the inherent existence of the self is not found
anywhere, this can upset one's conception of the way things are. At first it is disorienting and perhaps
scary. Later, it can be the source of
great joy.
1.
The
self is not inherently the same as the parts of the body/mind.
2.
The
self is not different from the parts of the body/mind.
3.
The
self is not dependent upon the parts of the body/mind.
4.
The
self is not inherently the substratum upon which the parts of the body/mind
depend.
5.
The
self is not inherently the possessor of the parts of the body/mind.
6.
The
self is not inherently the mere collection of the parts of the body/mind.
7.
The
self is not inherently the shape of the parts of the body/mind.
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Taking these one at a time,
1. The self is not
inherently the same as the parts of the body/mind. If we understand the parts as various groups
of physical, mental, and psychological factors, we ask: Is the self equal to these things? Is it equal to them individually? If it is, then certain counterintuitive results apply.
The self would be equal to each body part or each thought
individually. The self would be many
just as the parts are many. But we
don't think of the self as many, so it cannot be found in all the parts taken
individually. How about the parts taken
as a whole? This is also not what we
think of when we conceive of the inherent existence of the self. If the self is equal to the parts and the
self is single, then the parts must be one single entity. This is clearly not the case. Also, if the self is equal to all the parts,
then we could never get our hair cut, or lose a finger or gain a new
thought. For that newly missing or
added element changes the overall parts.
If the self is equal to all the parts, this new addition or deletion
would mean that we have a new self. But
our strong intuition is clearly that the self can undergo change. So the self cannot be equal to all the
parts. It is not just that we have not
looked hard enough. We have looked at
the possibility of the self being the parts.
In the parts we have found the lack of inherent existence of the
self. It cannot be there.
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2. The self is not
inherently different from the parts of the body/mind. If the self were inherently different from
its parts, then too odd things result.
You would be able to apprehend the self somehow in total isolation from
the parts. Conceptually, you would be
able to strip away the elements of the body/mind until none are left but
nevertheless still be able to point to the self. You would have to still be able to distinguish this partless self
from someone else's self. Where would
this partless self be? It must be able
to have a different location from the body. As they might say in Missouri,
“Show me that self with no parts.” The
self would be one thing and the parts would be a totally separate thing. So the self is not inherently different from
the parts of the body/mind.
3. The self is not inherently dependent upon
the parts of the body/mind. Is the
self inherently dependent upon the parts?
Sometimes we think so. Sometimes
the self appears as something above and beyond the parts, but somehow supported
or buoyed up by the parts. This
relation of dependence is another case of (2) above, the self being a different
entity from the parts, which has been refuted.
If the self is dependent on the parts, it must be different from the
parts. Why is dependence given as a
separate meditation in addition to mere difference? So we can gain insight on the falsity of the sense we often have
that dependence on the body/mind is a special way that the self truly
exists. It is almost is though the
sense of inherent existence is hiding out in the sense we have of
dependence.
Besides the
problem that dependence entails difference, which was refuted, there is another
problem with dependence. That is, what
is the link between the self in
question and this particular set of parts such that this self is dependent upon the parts? Why isn't another self
dependent upon the parts? Conversely,
why is the self in question dependent on these
particular parts and not my next-door neighbor's parts? Two more odd consequences follow if there
were inherent existence of the self in dependence on the parts. (a)
The self related to these parts… What makes that self my self? This supposedly inherently existent self fails to satisfy the
criteria that would make it my
self. I would need another self to bind
the parts and the self together under the auspices of "mine," but
this second self does not exist. Even
if it did, there would need to be yet another self to make that one mine, and
so on ad infinitum. And (b), why is
there not more than one self dependent upon the same set of parts? Why not? This is consistent with the
conditions given. Since this self is
totally different from the parts, I cannot see this self; other selves can be
supported by the same parts. These are
all natural conclusions if there is a self different from the parts that is
inherently dependent upon the parts. In
a search for the inherently existent self which depends on the parts of the
body/mind, this self has proved unfindable.
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4. The self is not inherently the substratum
upon which the parts of the body/mind depend. Do the parts inherently depend upon the self, which serves as
their substratum? This is another case
of the refuted alternative (2) above, the self being inherently different from
the parts. And it is similar to
alternative (3) above, with the dependence running in the opposite
direction. Similar consequences occur
with this alternative.
"Why these parts? Why this particular self?
Show it to me in isolation from the parts. No!
Not that one over there, this self!"
In addition,
since we are looking for the substratum in this case, trying to isolate it as
the inherently existent self, it is especially instructive to meditate on
this? Can more than one substratum
support the same set of parts? Either
simultaneously or in succession over time?
Assume for the moment a relation of
an inherently existing self as the substratum of the parts of the
body/mind. Is it the same at time T1 as
at time T2? Going by the reasoning of
case (4), there is no reason it cannot be a different self and no proof that it
is the same self. But if it is different, then we have the absurd
conclusion that the same body/mind is supported by two selves over time. Then, I would be an inherently different
self at T2 than I am at T1. And if the
body can depend on two selves simultaneously, then I am different from myself
even now! Therefore, the inherent
existence of the self cannot lie in its being the substratum on which the parts
of the body/mind depend.
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5. The self is not inherently the possessor of
the parts of the body/mind. This is
yet another case of (2), the self being different from the parts, as well as a
bit of (1), where the self is the same entity as the parts. But it is very fruitful to go though this
meditation completely on its own, since we have often have a strong conception
that the self possesses the parts of the body/mind. This alternative deserves its own meditative refutation.
Perhaps the
self possesses its parts in the way that I possess my hand. This would be a case in which I am the same
entity as my hand (as in (1) above.) If
this alternative is gone into, it becomes quite doubtful, since for me to
conceive strongly of possessing my hand, I must mentally pull away from the
hand for the moment at least, and conceive of myself as something other than
the hand. For me to be truly the same
entity as the hand, I cannot possess the hand.
A thing cannot possess itself.
So the self cannot possess the parts in this way.
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Or, perhaps I
possess my hand in the way that I possess the car. This is a case of (2) above, the possessor and the possessed as
two separate entities. In addition to the
impossibility of the self being a different entity from its parts, what is
there in common that links the parts and the self as possessor and
possessed? Just what is it that serves
as the possessor of the hand? It is not
the hand or any other part of the body or mind. Where is it? We can only
come up with a vacuity, the emptiness of the inherent existence of such an
inherently existing self.
6. The self is not
inherently the mere collection of the parts of the body/mind. Perhaps the self is inherently the mere
collection of the parts of the body/mind.
The falsity of this one is a little harder to realize. Our sense of inherent existence of the self
seems to put a little distance between the parts and the self. We seem to
conceive of a bit of a gap between appropriator and appropriated, between agent
and action, between "my" and "body/mind." In this alternative, all there is, is the
body/mind. Why even talk about the
self? There would be no need to have
something called "the self" which is exactly the parts of the
body/mind. Agent and action would be
one. Self and body/mind would be
one. The self would be redundant, and
unfindable. Also, in the Middle Way
schools of Buddhism that employ the Sevenfold Reasoning, it is said that the
conventional self is not the parts themselves, but is posited on the basis of
the parts. Based on apprehending those
particular parts, a designated self is said to exist conventionally. It is not the parts, but is based on the
parts. The appropriator and appropriated
are slightly and subtlely different.
There is room to make sense of "my life," "my
actions." A self redundant with
the parts cannot exist inherently.
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7. The self is not inherently the shape of
the parts of the body/mind.
This alternative investigates whether
the self is inherently the shape of the parts of the body/mind. Can this be? According to this, self would be a physical thing. Non-physical components such as a mind and
thoughts and values do not have a shape.
Even though these non-physical things are not inherently the self (as we
saw in (1) above), it certainly makes no sense for them to be totally irrelevant
to the self, as they would be if the self were merely the shape of the
parts. Also, if the self is the shape,
then this allows no change in shape without a corresponding change in identity
of the self. Over time the shape of the
body changes. People grow, gain weight,
perhaps take up yoga or weightlifting and tone up. Perhaps they lose a limb, lose their hair, become bent with age. Even in the absence of these kinds of shape
changes, there are the perceptual shape changes due to changes in posture,
standing vs. sitting. There are other
shape changes due to the angle from which the parts are viewed. From the left or the right, from near or
far, the appearance of the shape changes.
The shape criterion misses the point of our conception of the inherent
existence of the self, since according to that conception, the inherently
existing self is able to persist through changes in shape of the parts. So the self is not inherently the shape of
the parts.
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Conclusion
These
reasonings search for the inherently existent self. If it does exist, then logically, it must be either the same as
the parts of the body/mind, or different.
If it is different from the parts, then there are several seemingly
likely candidates proposed for what the self is and how it stands in relation
to those parts. But in every case, the
self was looked for and not found. What
was found instead was an absence, a vacuity, which is the lack of this
inherently existing self. The more we
understand the dynamics of the Sevenfold Reasonings, the more clearly we can
see how the inherently existing self cannot exist. We have the conception that things exist
inherently. But upon examination, we
see deeply that they cannot possibly exist in this way. There is an earth-shattering shift when this
meditation is done at a level deeper than intellectual word-play.
And if one refutes the object of inherent existence over and over, using
the examples of different kinds of phenomena, one will see something new begin
to happen. Persons and phenomena will
be conceived as conventionally existent but lacking inherent existence. This is the end of the conception of
inherent existence, and the end of painful and afflicted arisings such as the
following:
“How could she do that to me? That is absolutely not permissible! I have done so much for her, and this is the
gratitude I get!”
If these
feelings are greeted with even an intellectual, inferential cognition of the
emptiness of inherent existence, the sense of anger and indignation will
dissolve right then and there! And
should the conception of inherent existence ever come to an end, then feelings
and beliefs like these will arise no more.
According to the Buddhist Middle Way teachings, this is the end of
suffering and the end of one’s cyclical existence.
-- End --
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